The author purchased an expired DMARC reporting domain, gca-emailauth[.]org, for a nominal fee. This domain had been previously utilized by the Global Cyber Alliance for DMARC training and documentation. Upon registration, the author began receiving aggregate DMARC reports from numerous organizations. These reports originated from 86 domains across more than 20 entities. Notably, The Toro Company, a NYSE-listed firm, accounted for 56 of these domains, including their distributor platform myturf[.]com. Other recipients included educational institutions like the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point and the North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics. Government entities and several commercial domains also appeared in the reports. For many domains, the author's domain was a secondary reporting address, with primary processors like Proofpoint already in use. GCA engineers identified a former partner as the individual who allowed the domain to lapse. The author contacted all organizations whose reports were being received. Despite this disclosure, a significant number, 65 out of 86 domains, continued to publish the expired endpoint. Only 21 domains ceased publishing the endpoint, and very few responded to the notification. After an eight-month period of ownership, the author successfully coordinated the transfer of the domain back to the Global Cyber Alliance.