The author, a former academic, connects two current events to his past research on information flow and stock price volatility. These events are the SEC's proposal to shift to semi-annual company financial reporting and the new Fed Chair's suggestion to reduce forward guidance to markets. Both proposals involve removing information that markets have grown accustomed to, potentially increasing price volatility. Advocates argue that less frequent reporting and guidance reduce market short-termism and gaming, while opponents believe it removes vital pricing information. Historically, annual reporting was mandated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with quarterly reporting introduced later. However, companies voluntarily reported more frequently even before regulations, driven by stock exchanges and investor attraction. While the US has a long history of quarterly reporting, many other countries have experimented with and then abandoned it. Earnings reports have also significantly increased in word count over time due to accounting rule changes, macro events, legal protection, and guidance. This "disclosure diarrhea" paradoxically diminishes information usefulness. The "earnings game" involves analysts forecasting earnings, with consensus estimates becoming quasi-public. Market prices often react to positive or negative earnings surprises. However, companies can manipulate accounting rules to beat estimates, and markets may adjust to these predictable beats, leading to phenomena like "whispered earnings."