Google Online Security Blog Note

Google Online Security Blog

The Google Security Blog offers insights into Google's security team about a safer web for everyone. It provides updates, announcements, and insights on the latest security-related topics and technologies. This site serves as a vital platform for security community professionals, researchers, and everyday users to get informed about security threats, solutions, and best practices. The blog features various categories such as Android Security, Google Cloud Security, Chrome Security, and more. It also covers topics like cybersecurity policy, data privacy, and vulnerability management. There are also regular updates from Project Zero, Google's dedicated team for identifying vulnerabilities in popular software. Besides informative articles, the blog also hosts interviews, case studies, and the security team's personal stories, making it a versatile and engaging source of information. The security team actively responds and engages with the readers' comments, making the site an interactive platform for discussing security challenges and solutions. In summary, the Google Security Blog is a comprehensive and regularly updated site that caters to a broad audience, including security professionals, researchers, and users. It aims to create a safer web by sharing and encouraging security-related discussions, and by offering advice and insights on how to protect and secure data.

Thread Of Notes

The Android Security Team is committed to providing multi-layered defenses to protect users from phone theft and financial fraud. Phone theft can leave users vulnerable to personal data and financial theft, making it essential to have robust security measures in place. The team has announced a set of theft protection feature updates that build on existing protections to give users greater peace of mind. These updates include stronger authentication safeguards, such as expanded security to protect against a wider range of threats, available for Android devices running Android 16+. The Failed Authentication Lock feature now has a dedicated enable/disable toggle in settings, giving users more control over their device's security. The Identity Check feature has been expanded to cover more apps and tools that use the Android Biometric Prompt, including third-party banking apps and Google Password Manager. The team has also made it harder for thieves to guess screen locks by increasing the lockout time after failed attempts. Enhanced recovery tools are also being introduced, including a new optional security question for Remote Lock, to make it easier for users to recover their lost or stolen devices. In Brazil, two key theft protection features, Theft Detection Lock and Remote Lock, are now enabled by default for new Android devices, providing an additional layer of security from day one. The Android Security Team is committed to continuing to innovate and evolve its protections to stay one step ahead of thieves and provide users with greater peace of mind.
The Chrome Root Program and the CA/Browser Forum have implemented new security requirements for HTTPS certificate issuers to create a more secure internet. These initiatives aim to retire outdated Domain Control Validation methods that rely on weaker verification signals, such as physical mail, phone calls, or emails. The deprecation of these methods will be phased in, with full security value realized by March 2028, allowing website operators to transition smoothly. Domain Control Validation is a security-critical process that ensures certificates are only issued to the legitimate domain operator, preventing unauthorized entities from obtaining a certificate. The process involves a Certification Authority verifying that the requestor controls the domain, often through challenge-response mechanisms. Historically, other methods validated control through indirect means, which have been proven vulnerable to attacks. The recently passed CA/Browser Forum Server Certificate Working Group Ballots introduce a phased sunset of weaker Domain Control Validation methods, replacing them with robust, automated alternatives. The sunsetted methods include those relying on email, phone, and reverse lookup, which will be replaced by standardized, modern, and auditable methods. These changes will make it harder for attackers to trick a CA into issuing a certificate for a domain they don't control, reducing the risk of stale or indirect signals being abused. The ultimate goal of these initiatives is to create a safer browsing experience for everyone by removing weak links in how trust is established on the internet.
Google's Android Red Team partnered with Arm to conduct a security analysis of the Mali GPU, a component used in billions of Android devices worldwide. The goal of this collaboration was to identify and fix vulnerabilities in the GPU software and firmware stack. The Mali GPU has become a critical target for attackers due to its complexity and privileged access to the system, with the majority of Android kernel driver-based exploits targeting the GPU since 2021. To improve security, the team focused on reducing the driver's attack surface by restricting access to certain GPU IOCTLs. The team used SELinux to harden the GPU by blocking access to deprecated and debug IOCTLs in production, while allowing access to instrumentation IOCTLs only for debugging tools. The approach was rolled out in stages, starting with an "opt-in" policy and moving to an "opt-out" policy, to minimize the impact on developers. The team also provided step-by-step instructions on how to implement a robust SELinux policy to filter GPU ioctls. The core principle is to create a flexible, platform-level macro that allows each device to define its own specific lists of GPU ioctl commands to be restricted. The Android security team is committed to collaborating with ecosystem partners to drive broader adoption of this approach to help harden the GPU. By reducing the attack surface, this approach provides strong protection against existing and future vulnerabilities, and the team is working to raise the bar on GPU security to ensure the Mali GPU driver and firmware remain highly resilient against potential threats. The partnership with Arm and the use of SELinux have been crucial in achieving this goal, and the team is committed to continuing this effort to improve the security of Android devices.
Chrome will enable "Always Use Secure Connections" by default for all users in October 2026, starting with Chrome 154. This change aims to enhance user safety by prioritizing HTTPS connections and warning users before they access sites without secure protocols. The decision follows a decade of increasing HTTPS adoption, which has now plateaued around 95-99% for public sites. While this represents a significant security improvement, the remaining HTTP navigations, though a small percentage, still pose risks. Attackers can exploit insecure HTTP connections to redirect users to malicious sites, leading to malware or data breaches. The "Always Use Secure Connections" setting, first introduced as an opt-in feature in 2022, will now be the default. This mode will attempt HTTPS connections first and display a bypassable warning if HTTPS is unavailable. To minimize user annoyance, Chrome will avoid repeatedly warning about the same insecure site. The primary remaining use of HTTP is for private, local network sites, where obtaining HTTPS certificates is more complex. However, a new local network access permission in Chrome is designed to facilitate migrating these sites to HTTPS. Before the full rollout, Chrome 147 in April 2026 will enable this setting for users with Enhanced Safe Browsing protections. Website developers and IT professionals are encouraged to test and migrate their sites to HTTPS now. Future work will focus on further reducing barriers to HTTPS adoption, particularly for local network sites.
Rowhammer is a hardware vulnerability in DRAM where repeated access to one memory row can corrupt data in adjacent rows. This can be exploited for unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or denial of service. While mitigations like ECC and Target Row Refresh (TRR) exist, their effectiveness against sophisticated attackers is questionable. Google has supported research and developed test platforms to analyze DDR5 memory and discover new attacks. Rowhammer exploits DRAM's need for periodic refresh cycles to maintain data, and aggressive access can cause bit flips. Attackers can leverage this by inducing bit flips and coercing the system to use those corrupted pages. Previous research has demonstrated Rowhammer attacks from software, making it a concern for multi-tenant environments like the cloud. Target Row Refresh (TRR) attempts to mitigate this by refreshing victim rows when adjacent aggressor rows are accessed frequently. However, attacks like TRRespass have shown TRR can be bypassed. Google collaborated on PRAC, a new mitigation that deterministically tracks memory row activations. Current DDR5 systems often rely on probabilistic measures like ECC and enhanced TRR, whose effectiveness against new attacks was unclear. Assessing Rowhammer requires understanding how mitigations work, how software accesses translate to low-level commands, and the role of host-side mitigations. Reverse-engineering proprietary DRAM mechanisms and analyzing DDR traffic necessitate specialized test platforms. Google partnered with Antmicro to create open-source FPGA-based Rowhammer test platforms for RDIMMs and SO-DIMMs. Using these platforms, researchers developed custom attack patterns that bypassed enhanced TRR on DDR5, leading to the first Rowhammer privilege escalation on a production desktop. Current mitigations are insufficient due to probabilistic countermeasures lacking sufficient entropy and ECC not being designed as a security measure. Memory encryption without integrity checks is also not a viable defense. Google continues to work on improving countermeasures and collaborates with partners to enhance analysis and testing, sharing findings with the broader ecosystem.
The Google Open Source Security Team has announced OSS Rebuild, a project aimed at strengthening trust in open source package ecosystems by reproducing upstream artifacts. The project provides automation to derive declarative build definitions, SLSA Provenance for thousands of packages, and build observability and verification tools. OSS Rebuild helps security teams avoid compromise without burdening upstream maintainers. Open source software has become the foundation of our digital world, but its ubiquity makes it an attractive target for supply chain attacks. Recent high-profile attacks have eroded trust in open ecosystems, creating hesitation among contributors and consumers. OSS Rebuild empowers the security community to deeply understand and control their supply chains by making package consumption transparent. The project uses a declarative build process, build instrumentation, and network monitoring capabilities to produce fine-grained, durable, trustworthy security metadata. OSS Rebuild can detect several classes of supply chain compromise, including unsubmitted source code, build environment compromise, and stealthy backdoors. The project provides capabilities for enterprises, security professionals, publishers, and maintainers of open source packages to enhance metadata, augment SBOMs, and accelerate vulnerability response. OSS Rebuild invites developers, enterprises, and security researchers to get involved and contribute to improving support for critical ecosystems and packages.
Google Chrome has announced the removal of default trust of Chunghwa Telecom and Netlock due to patterns of concerning behavior observed over the past year. The Chrome Root Program Policy requires Certification Authority certificates to provide value to Chrome end users that exceeds the risk of their continued inclusion. Chrome's confidence in the reliability of Chunghwa Telecom and Netlock as CA Owners has diminished, leading to a loss of integrity and trust. As a result, Chrome will no longer trust new TLS certificates issued by these CAs starting from August 1, 2025, in versions 139 and higher. This change will affect certificates issued after July 31, 2025, but will not impact existing certificates issued before this date. Website operators can determine if they are affected by using the Chrome Certificate Viewer and are recommended to transition to a new publicly-trusted CA Owner as soon as possible. To minimize disruption, Chrome has introduced a command-line flag that allows administrators and power users to simulate the effect of the change before it takes effect. Enterprises can override Chrome Root Store constraints by installing the corresponding root CA certificate as a locally-trusted root on the platform Chrome is running. The change will occur in versions of Chrome 139 and greater on Windows, macOS, ChromeOS, Android, and Linux, but will not affect Chrome for iOS due to Apple policies. Overall, the goal of this change is to safeguard Chrome users and preserve the integrity of the Chrome Root Store by ensuring that only trusted and reliable CA Owners are included.
The Sec-Gemini team has announced the release of Sec-Gemini v1, an experimental AI model designed to advance cybersecurity AI frontiers. The model aims to help defenders secure against cyber threats by leveraging AI-powered cybersecurity workflows. Currently, defenders face a daunting task of securing against all cyber threats, while attackers only need to find and exploit a single vulnerability. AI-powered cybersecurity workflows have the potential to shift the balance back to the defenders by force multiplying cybersecurity professionals. Sec-Gemini v1 combines advanced capabilities with near real-time cybersecurity knowledge and tooling to achieve superior performance on key cybersecurity workflows. The model outperforms other models on key cybersecurity benchmarks, including incident root cause analysis, threat analysis, and vulnerability impact understanding. Sec-Gemini v1 is made freely available to select organizations, institutions, professionals, and NGOs for research purposes to promote collaboration across the cybersecurity community. The model has been integrated with Google Threat Intelligence, OSV, and other key data sources, allowing it to provide comprehensive answers to key cybersecurity questions. Sec-Gemini v1 has demonstrated its capabilities by outperforming other models on the CTI-MCQ and CTI-Root Cause Mapping benchmarks, with improvements of at least 11% and 10.5% respectively. The Sec-Gemini team is inviting interested parties to collaborate on advancing the AI cybersecurity frontier by requesting early access to Sec-Gemini v1 through a provided form.
The Google Open Source Security Team, in partnership with NVIDIA and HiddenLayer, has launched the first stable version of a model signing library as part of the Open Source Security Foundation. This library allows users to verify that the model used by an application is the same one created by the developers, using digital signatures like those from Sigstore. The rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs) has opened the door to new security threats, including model and data poisoning, prompt injection, and prompt evasion. The ML supply chain process is vulnerable to tampering, as models are an uninspectable collection of weights that can be altered by attackers. To achieve trust in models, users need to verify their integrity and provenance, which can be done through cryptographic signing. The ML supply chain involves three stages: training, fine-tuning, and embedding into an application, each handled by different teams or companies, creating opportunities for tampering. Model signing can prevent tampering by verifying the model's integrity at each stage. The released model signing library is a Python package that supports Sigstore and traditional signing methods, and can handle the scale of ML models. The goal is to extend model signing to include datasets and other ML-related artifacts, and to build tamper-proof metadata records that can automate incident response. The project aims to create a trust ecosystem for ML, and invites the open source community to join and shape its future.
Google has released OSV-SCALIBR, an extensible library for software composition analysis and file system scanning. This library combines Google's internal vulnerability management expertise and offers significant new capabilities such as SCA for installed packages, standalone binaries, and source code. It also supports OS package scanning on Linux, Windows, and Mac, as well as artifact and lockfile scanning in major language ecosystems. OSV-SCALIBR can generate SBOMs in SPDX and CycloneDX formats and is optimized for on-host scanning of resource-constrained environments.The library is now the primary SCA engine used within Google for live hosts, code repos, and containers. It has been used and tested extensively across many different products and internal tools to help generate SBOMs, find vulnerabilities, and protect user data. OSV-SCALIBR is offered primarily as an open-source Go library, and its capabilities are modularized into plugins for software extraction and vulnerability detection.Developers can use OSV-SCALIBR as a library to generate SBOMs from build artifacts and code repos on live hosts, scan a git repo for SBOMs, and scan a remote container for SBOMs. The library can also be used to find vulnerabilities on a filesystem or a remote container. Google is working on integrating OSV-SCALIBR more deeply into OSV-Scanner, which will make more of OSV-SCALIBR's capabilities available in the next few months.OSV-Scanner will become the primary frontend to the OSV-SCALIBR library for users who require a CLI interface. Existing users of OSV-Scanner can continue to use the tool with backwards compatibility maintained for all existing use cases. Google is also working on additional new capabilities, including support for more OS and language ecosystems, layer attribution, and reachability analysis.
DevOps teams can now improve their image and container security by utilizing Google-grade vulnerability scanning, which offers expanded open-source coverage through Google Cloud Platform's integrated security tools, including Artifact Analysis. Artifact Analysis has recently expanded its scanning coverage to eight additional language packages, four operating systems, and two extensively utilized base images. This enhanced coverage was achieved by integrating Artifact Analysis with the Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV) platform and database, providing industry-leading insights into open source vulnerabilities. With these updates, customers can now successfully scan the vast majority of the images they push to Artifact Registry, detecting and reporting known vulnerabilities. Artifact Analysis pulls vulnerability information directly from OSV, which is the only open source, distributed vulnerability database that gets information directly from open source practitioners. OSV's database provides a consistent, high-quality database of vulnerabilities from authoritative sources, ensuring accurate information to reliably match software dependencies to known vulnerabilities. The OSV database has increased its total coverage to 28 language and OS ecosystems over the past three years, including industry leaders such as GitHub and Ubuntu. As a result of OSV's expansion, scanners like Artifact Analysis now alert users to higher quality vulnerability information across a broader set of ecosystems. Existing Artifact Registry scanning customers will immediately benefit from this expanded coverage, and vulnerability findings will continue to be available in the Artifact Registry UI, Container Analysis API, and via pub/sub. In 2025, Artifact Analysis capabilities will be integrated with Google Cloud's Security Command Center, allowing customers to maintain a more comprehensive vulnerability management program.